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Abstract
We explore the macroeconomic impact of a compression in the long-term
bond yield spread within the context of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 via a
Bayesian time-varying parameter structural VAR. We identify a ‘pure’ spread
shock which, leaving the short-term rate unchanged by construction, allows us
to characterise the macroeconomic impact of a compression in the yield spread
induced by central banks’ asset purchases within an environment in which the
short rate cannot move because it is constrained by the zero lower bound. Two
main ﬁndings stand out.
First, in all the countries we analyse (U.S., Euro area, Japan, and U.K.)
a compression in the long-term yield spread exerts a powerful eﬀect on both
output growth and inﬂation.
Second, conditional on available estimates of the impact of the FED’s and
the Bank of England’s asset purchase programmes on long-term government
bond yield spreads, our counterfactual simulations indicate that U.S. and U.K.
unconventional monetary policy actions have averted signiﬁcant risks both of
deﬂation and of output collapses comparable to those that took place during
the Great Depression.5
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Non Technical Summary
This paper investigates the macroeconomic impact of a compression in the long-term
bond yield spread within the context of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 via Bayesian
time-varying parameter structural VARs for the Euro area, the United States, Japan,
and the United Kingdom. The paper’s main focus is on two questions:
• ‘How eﬀective have central banks’ unconventional monetary policy actions been
at countering the recessionary shocks associated with the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial
crisis?’
• ‘More generally, how powerful is monetary policy at the zero lower bound, once
all traditional ammunition has been exhausted?’
A key feature of the empirical strategy is the identiﬁcation of a ‘pure’ spread shock
which, leaving the short-term rate unchanged by construction, allows to characterise
the macroeconomic impact of a compression in long-term yield spreads induced by
central banks’ asset purchase programmes within an environment in which the short
rate cannot move because it is constrained by the zero lower bound.
The paper’s main results may be summarised as follows.
First, in all the countries which are analysed herein, a compression in the long-
term yield spread exerts a powerful eﬀect on both output growth and inﬂation.
Second, evidence clearly highlights the importance of allowing for time variation,
as the impact of a spread compression exhibits, in several cases, important changes
over the sample period. In the United States, for example, the impact on inﬂation
exhibits three peaks corresponding to the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s, the recession of
the early 1990s, and the most recent period, whereas the 1990s were characterised by
as i g n i ﬁcantly weaker impact. By the same token, in the United Kingdom the impact
on both inﬂation and output growth appears to have become stronger in recent years.
This automatically implies that, for the present purposes, the use of ﬁxed-coeﬃcient
models estimated over (say) the last two decades would oﬀer a distorted picture, as it
would under-estimate the impact resulting from yield spread compressions engineered
by central banks via asset purchase programmes in countering the recessionary shocks
associated with the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis.
Third, conditional on Gagnon et al.’s (2010) estimates of the impact of the FED’s
asset purchase programme on the 10-year government bond yield spread, counter-
factual simulations indicate that U.S. unconventional monetary policy actions have
averted signiﬁcant risks both of deﬂation and of output collapses comparable to those
that took place during the Great Depression. The same holds true for the United
Kingdom conditional on Bean’s (2009) broad estimate of the impact of the Bank of
England’s asset purchase programmes on long-term yield spreads.6
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The decisive policy easing by the Fed and the ECB during the crisis, and the adoption
of unconventional measures by the two central banks, was crucial in countering the threat
of deﬂation in the current episode.
–Athanasios Orphanides1
1 Introduction
This paper tackles two questions:
• ‘How eﬀective have central banks’ unconventional monetary policy actions been
at countering the recessionary shocks associated with the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial
crisis?’
• ‘More generally, how powerful is monetary policy at the zero lower bound, once
all traditional ammunition has been exhausted?’
We explore the macroeconomic impact of a compression in the long-term bond
yield spread within the context of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 via Bayesian
time-varying parameter structural VARs for the Euro area, the United States, Japan,
and the United Kingdom. We identify a ‘pure’ spread shock which, leaving the short-
term rate unchanged by construction, allows us to characterise the macroeconomic
impact of a compression in long-term yield spreads induced by central banks’ asset
purchase programmes within an environment in which the short rate cannot move
because it is constrained by the zero lower bound.
Our main results may be summarised as follows.
First, in all the countries we analyse, a compression in the long-term yield spread
exerts a powerful eﬀect on both output growth and inﬂation.
Second, evidence clearly highlights the importance of allowing for time variation,
as the impact of a spread compression exhibits, in several cases, important changes
over the sample period. In the United States, for example, the impact on inﬂation
exhibits three peaks corresponding to the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s, the recession of
the early 1990s, and the most recent period, whereas the 1990s were characterised by
a signiﬁcantly weaker impact. By the same token, in the United Kingdom the impact
on both inﬂation and output growth appears to have become stronger in recent years.
This automatically implies that, for the present purposes, the use of ﬁxed-coeﬃcient
models estimated over (say) the last two decades would oﬀer a distorted picture, as it
1Keynote Speech by Athanasios Orphanides, Governor, Central Bank of Cyprus, at the
‘International Research Forum on Monetary Policy’, Federal Reserve Board, March 27,
2010.7
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would under-estimate the impact resulting from yield spread compressions engineered
by central banks via asset purchase programmes in countering the recessionary shocks
associated with the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis.
Third, conditional on Gagnon et al.’s (2010) estimates of the impact of the FED’s
asset purchase programme on the 10-year government bond yield spread,2 our coun-
terfactual simulations indicate that U.S. unconventional monetary policy actions have
averted signiﬁcant risks both of deﬂation and of output collapses comparable to those
that took place during the Great Depression. The same holds true for the United
Kingdom conditional on Charlie Bean’s (2009) broad estimate of the impact of the
Bank of England’s asset purchase programmes on long-term yield spreads.3
1.1 Related literature
The results of this paper can be linked to some recent contributions in the literature.
Evidence, albeit reduced form, of a negative relationship between the term premium
and real economic activity is provided by Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007)
who show that a decline in the term premium of 10-year Treasury yields tends to
boost GDP growth. Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007) study the transmission
of credit spread shocks originating in the corporate bond market to the broader
economy within a structural framework. Based on a factor-augmented VAR model,
they demonstrate that an unexpected widening of credit spreads leads to a signiﬁcant
contraction of economic activity and a fall in prices. Extending their model to allow
the interaction between the ﬁnancial sector and the macroeconomy to evolve over
time, Ahmadi (2009) presents evidence of substantial changes in the responses of key
macroeconomic variables to credit spread shocks, the strength of which appear to be
associated with periods of higher and lower ﬁnancial market volatility and the state
of the business cycle. However, since both studies allow identiﬁed spread shocks to
trigger a reaction in the policy rate, no consideration is given to the possibility of
monetary policy being constrained by the zero lower bound.
A recent empirical contribution that is closest in spirit to ours in that it investi-
gates the macroeconomic eﬀect of a decline in interest rate spreads for a given level of
the policy rate is Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010). They focus on the likely impact of
the ECB’s unconventional policy actions on the short-end of the yield curve by con-
trasting macroeconomic outcomes resulting from a policy versus a no-policy scenario
which diﬀer only in the evolution of short-term interest rates. Put diﬀerently, in order
to gauge the eﬀectiveness of policy intervention in warding oﬀ disastrous macroeco-
nomic consequences, they conduct a forecasting exercise of key variables based on a
reduced-form VAR model conditional upon a counterfactual and an observed path
of money market rates. However, their analysis builds on the premise that the un-
derlying behavioural relationships have not been aﬀected by the crisis, which stands
2See Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010).
3See Bean (2009).8
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in stark contrast to our ﬁndings of remarkable time variation over the whole sample
period, not just during the most recent episode of ﬁnancial turmoil. While they show
that the narrowing of spreads induces economic stimulus, these beneﬁcial eﬀects take
hold only after a considerable delay.
DelNegro, Eggertson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) propose to quantify the ef-
fect of non-standard policy measures in a general equilibrium model that features
credit frictions with an explicit role for the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
In particular, they show (by means of simulations calibrated on the actual size of
liquidity provisions and purchase programmes) that changes in the relative supply of
liquid and illiquid assets available in the economy, as a result of unconventional pol-
icy operations, helped avoid a second Great Depression by counteracting deﬂationary
tendencies and the drop in output. They observe that the eﬀects of policy-induced
liquidity shocks are more powerful when the zero lower bound is binding, thereby em-
phasizing the need to take this constraint into account when evaluating the impact
of a compression in the yield spread.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the
key features of the reduced-form VAR model we are using herein, it discusses the rea-
sons behind such a modelling choice, and it illustrates both the identiﬁcation scheme
and the motivation behind it. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence. Section 4
concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 A Bayesian time-varying parameter VAR with stochastic
volatility
In what follows, we will work with the time-varying parameter VAR(p) model used
by Benati (2010b), which is a slightly modiﬁed version of the one used by Cogley,
Primiceri, and Sargent (2010),
Yt = B0,t + B1,tYt−1 + ... + Bp,tYt−p + ǫt ≡ X
′
tθt + ǫt (1)
where the notation is obvious, with Yt ≡ [rt, st, πt, yt]′, with rt, st, πt, and yt
being the short-term (policy) rate, the 10-year government bond yield spread, GDP
deﬂator inﬂation, and real GDP growth, respectively. (For a description of the data,
see Appendix A.)
Consistent with the vast majority of papers in the literature, and mostly for
reasons of computational feasibility, the lag order is set to p=2. Following, e.g.
Cogley and Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Primiceri (2005) the
VAR’s time-varying parameters, collected in the vector θt, are postulated to evolve
according to
p(θt | θt−1, Qt) = I(θt) f(θt | θt−1, Qt) (2)9
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2.1.1 Rationale for using the proposed reduced-form VAR
As we just mentioned, the time-varying parameter VAR we use herein features a
stochastic volatility speciﬁcation for both the VAR’s reduced-form innovations, and
the innovations to the VAR’s random-walk parameters.
The key reason for using a time-varying parameter speciﬁcation is to be able to re-
cover impulse-response functions (henceforth, IRFs) which are localised in time, thus
allowing us to characterise the impact of a compression of the bond yield spread in-
duced by central bank’s unconventional monetary policies during the Great Recession
of 2007-2009. In this respect, the use of ﬁxed-coeﬃcient models would be especially
unadvisable both (i) at a very general level, in light of the widespread evidence of
instability in macroeconomic time series;6 and (ii) speciﬁcally within the present
context, because the notion that the dramatic economic contraction associated with
the Great Recession has left key structural macroeconomic relationships unchanged
is entirely open to question. To put it diﬀerently, postulating that structural eco-
nomic dynamics have remained unchanged in the face of such a severe macroeconomic
dislocation–which is what is implicitly done when using ﬁxed-coeﬃcient models–is
essentially a leap of faith.7
Having provided the rationale for using a time-varying parameter speciﬁcation
for the reduced-form VAR, we now ought to discuss the need for a speciﬁcation
with a time-varying extent of drift, which is what a stochastic-volatility speciﬁca-
tion for the innovations to the random-walk parameters delivers. The reason here
is straightforward: as a simple inspection of the raw macroeconomic data reveals,
key macroeconomic variables–ﬁrst and foremost, interest rates, inﬂation, and out-
put growth–have been remarkably volatile during the Great Inﬂation of the 1970s,
extremely stable during the Great Moderation period, and, in the case of output
growth and interest rates, once again very volatile during the Great Recession. The
traditional, ‘ﬁrst-generation’ time-varying parameter models–see in particular, Cog-
ley and Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Primiceri (2005)–have a
hard time ﬁtting such a pattern of time variation successfully, as they postulate that
the extent of random-walk drift is constant along the sample. As a result, they tend
to ‘under-drift’ (that is, to drift too little) during the Great Inﬂation period, and
to ‘over-drift’ (that is, to drift too much) during the Great Moderation period, thus
automatically distorting inference. (Based on our own experience, this is especially
apparent for the Euro area: evidence on this is available upon request.) The logical
solution is a model with a time-varying extent of drift, which, thanks to its ﬂexibility,
is capable of capturing changes over time in the macroeconomic structure.
6See, ﬁrst and foremost, Stock and Watson (1996).
7In this respect, the fact that the model used herein features a time-speciﬁc extent of random-
walk time variation in the VAR’s coeﬃcients is especially important, as it allows the dynamics of the
VAR’s coeﬃcients ‘to lay dormant’ for comparatively long periods–so that during those quarters
the model approximates a ﬁxed-coeﬃcient VAR–and then to pick up speed in a data-driven way,
as the information contained in the sample suggests.12
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2.2 Estimation
We estimate (1)-(10) via standard Bayesian methods. Appendix B discusses our
choices for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to simu-
late the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional on
the data.
2.3 Assessing the convergence of the Markov chain to the
ergodic distribution
Following Primiceri (2005), we assess the convergence of the Markov chain by inspect-
ing the autocorrelation properties of the ergodic distribution’s draws. Speciﬁcally, in
what follows, we consider the draws’ ineﬃciency factors (henceforth, IFs), deﬁned as







where S(ω) is the spectral density of the sequence of draws from the Gibbs sampler
for the quantity of interest at the frequency ω. We estimate the spectral densities by
smoothing the periodograms in the frequency domain by means of a Bartlett spectral
window. Following Berkowitz and Diebold (1998), we select the bandwidth parameter
automatically via the procedure introduced by Beltrao and Bloomﬁeld (1987).
Figures 1-4 show, for the Euro area, the United States, and Japan, based on the
10-year government bond yield spread, and for the United Kingdom, based on the
‘long-term government bond yield’ from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics,
the draws’ IFs for the models’ hyperparameters–i.e. the free elements of the matrices
Zν, Zω, S1, S2, and S3–and for the states, i.e. the time-varying coeﬃcients of the VAR
(the θt’s), the volatilities of the innovations to the VAR’s random-walk parameters
(the qi,t’s), the volatilities of the VAR’s reduced-form innovations (the hi,t’s), and the
non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At. As the ﬁgures show, for all countries
the autocorrelation of the draws is uniformly very low, being in the vast majority
of cases around or below 3,8 thus suggesting that the Markov chains have indeed
converged.
2.4 How reasonable are our priors? An informal assessment
Since the reliability of our results ultimately depends upon the meaningfulness of
the assumptions underlying our analysis, it is important to get an idea about how
reasonable our priors in fact are (the next sub-section, on the other hand, discusses
our identiﬁcation assumptions). A simple and informal check we routinely use when
8As stressed by Primiceri (2005, Appendix B), values of the IFs below or around twenty are
generally regarded as satisfactory.13
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we work with time-varying parameter VARs, in order to assess the reasonableness of
the Bayesian priors, is to look at the inﬂation trends produced by the model. For the
United States, in particular, there is a vast consensus–stemming, ﬁrst and foremost,
from the work of Cogley and Sargent–that trend inﬂation peaked, during the 1970s,
between 7 and 8 percent, and signiﬁcantly declined since then. If the Bayesian priors
underlying our analysis are in any way reliable, the estimated time-varying VAR for
the United States should generate comparable results.
Figure 5 plots, for the Euro area, the United States, Japan, and the United King-
dom, actual GDP deﬂator inﬂation together with the time-varying trends generated
by the model. Several things are apparent from the ﬁgure. In particular, ﬁrst, con-
cerning the United States, the median inﬂation trend peaks at about 7 percent during
the second half of the 1970s, exactly in line with the just-mentioned previous evidence.
Second, in general, the estimated inﬂation trends manifestly appear to capture the
slow-moving, low-frequency component of inﬂation, and are indeed very strongly cor-
related with simple heuristic measures of trend inﬂation such as the Hodrick-Prescott
trend. In particular, in Japan, where the GDP deﬂator has decreased, as of 2009Q4,
by 14.3 percent compared with the peak reached in 1994Q2, the period of deﬂation
following the mid-1990s is especially apparent, with trend inﬂation estimated, at the
end of 2009, at minus 1.5 percent.
2.5 Identiﬁcation
We achieve identiﬁcation by imposing a mixture of sign restrictions9 and zero restric-
tions on impact. Speciﬁcally, we identify three ‘traditional’ shocks–monetary policy,
demand non-policy, and supply–via a standard set of sign restrictions (see e.g. Be-
nati (2008) and Benati and Goodhart (2010))–together with an additional shock to
the spread which, by construction, is postulated to leave the policy rate unchanged,
and is therefore recovered via a zero restriction on impact. A key point to stress is
that, for the present purposes, the identiﬁcation of a ‘pure’ spread shock–which, by
construction, leaves the short-term rate unchanged–is of crucial importance, as it
allows us to explore the impact of a compression of the yield spread within an envi-
ronment in which the policy rate is bound to stay unchanged for an extended period
(in what follows, we will leave it unchanged for 8 quarters after the impact).10 Both
the sign restrictions and the zero restriction are imposed only on impact.
The set of restrictions on the structural impact matrix at zero is summarised in
the following table. It can be trivially shown that this set of restrictions is suﬃcient
to separate the various shocks from one another, thus achieving identiﬁcation.
9See e.g. Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Faust (1998), Peersman (2005), and Uhlig (2005).
10This implies that agents expect the zero bound to be binding for a period of 8 quarters. Ac-
cording to Del Negro et al. (2010), this is a reasonable assumption for the duration of the constraint
as it is in line with survey evidence of market participants during the crisis.14
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Short rate > 0 0 > 0 ?
Spread ≤ 0 > 0 ? ?
Inﬂation ≤ 0 < 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0
Output growth ≤ 0 < 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
? = left unconstrained
We compute the time-varying structural impact matrix, A0,t, by combining the
procedure proposed by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005) for imposing sign
restrictions 11 with the imposition of a single zero restriction via a deterministic rota-
tion matrix. Speciﬁcally, let  t = PtDtP′
t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition
of the VAR’s time-varying covariance matrix  t, and let ˜ A0,t ≡ PtD
1
2
t . We draw an
N × N matrix, K, from the N(0, 1) distribution, we take the QR decomposition of
K–that is, we compute matrices Q and R such that K=Q R–and we compute the
time-varying structural impact matrix as   A0,t= ˜ A0,t   Q′. We then impose a zero in
the (1,2) position of   A0,t via an appropriate rotation of   A0,t. Speciﬁcally, by deﬁning
a rotation matrix   R as









with   R     R′=I4 (with I4 being the 4×4 identity matrix), where θ=tan−1(   A
1,2
0,t/   A
1,1
0,t),
where   A
i,j
0,t is the (i,j) element of   A0,t, we have that A0,t=   A0,t     R has a zero in the
(1,2) position. If A0,t satisﬁes the sign restrictions–which, by construction, were
satisﬁed by   A0,t–we keep it, otherwise we discard it and we repeat the procedure
until we obtain an impact matrix which satisﬁes both the sign restrictions and the
zero restriction at the same time.
2.5.1 Rationale for the identiﬁcation scheme
As we just mentioned, the three ‘traditional’ shocks are identiﬁed via a standard set
of sign restrictions. As it is well known, especially from the work of Fabio Canova
and his co-authors,12 a key advantage of sign restrictions compared to alternative
identiﬁcation schemes based on restrictions on impact–for example, Cholesky for
identifying monetary policy shocks–is that they are, in principle, fully compatible
with general equilibrium (that is, DSGE) models, whereas for alternative identiﬁca-
tion schemes this is not necessarily the case. Canova and Pina (2005), in particular,
11See at http://home.earthlink.net/~tzha02/ProgramCode/SRestrictRWZalg.m.
12See e.g. Canova and Pina (2005) and Canova (2007).15
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provide dramatic illustrations of how applying Cholesky, in order to identify mon-
etary policy shocks, to series generated by a standard DSGE model dramatically
distorts inference, for example generating ‘price puzzles’ which are not in the original
data-generation process. Although, in principle, demand and supply shocks could be
recovered via alternative schemes,13 our need to be able to identify, on top of them,
the monetary policy shock naturally leads us towards sign restrictions. On the other
hand, the very nature of the question we are trying to answer–‘What is the macro-
economic impact of a spread compression in a situation in which the central bank
leaves the policy rate unchanged?’–logically implies that the spread shock, which is
the key object of interest here, cannot possibly be recovered via sign restrictions, and
can only be extracted from the data by means of a zero restriction on impact.
3 Evidence on the Impact of a Compression in the
Yield Spread
In this section we tackle two groups of questions.
First, conditional on available estimates of the impact of central banks’ asset
purchase programmes on long-term government bond yield spreads, what role did
unconventional monetary policy play within the context of the 2007-2009 Great Re-
cession? In particular, did central banks’ unconventional monetary policy actions
avert signiﬁcant risks of deﬂation and of output contractions, on a scale comparable
to those which took place during the Great Depression?
Second, how large is the impact of a compression in the long-term yield spread on
inﬂation and output growth within an environment in which the short-term (policy)
rate does not move, because–in the present context–it is constrained by the zero
lower bound? And has such impact changed over time?
We address the two groups of issues in turn.
3.1 Did unconventional monetary policies avert catastrophic
outcomes?
In tackling the issue of whether central banks’ unconventional monetary policy ac-
tions have averted signiﬁcant risks of deﬂation and large-scale output contractions we
uniquely focus on the U.S. and U.K. experience. There are two reasons for that. First,
in both countries central banks have been very explicit about their goal of ‘ﬂattening
the yield curve’ (that is, compressing the long-short spread) via asset purchases in
order to stimulate aggregate demand. That was not the case, for example, for the
Euro area, and for the ECB’s ‘enhanced credit support’ policy, which never had, as
its fundamental objective, to compress spreads in order to jolt aggregate demand.
13See e.g. Blanchard and Quah (1989).16
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Rather, the key objective of the ECB’s policy has always been to provide proper
support to dysfunctional credit markets, so that a decrease in the spreads would only
ultimately come as a result of a normalisation of the situation. Second, and crucially,
for the United States and the United Kingdom we can rely on Gagnon et al.’s and
Bean’s estimates of the impact of quantitative easing policies on the term spread.
3.1.1 The United States
In their extensive empirical analysis of the impact of the FED’s asset purchase pro-
grammes on U.S. long-term yield spreads, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010)
conclude that
‘[...] these purchases caused economically meaningful and long-lasting
reductions in longer-term interest rates on a range of securities, including
on securities that were not included in the purchase programs. [...] Our
results [based on time-series methods] suggest that the $1.725 trillion in
announced purchases reduced the 10-year term premium by between 38
and 82 basis points. This range of point forecasts overlaps considerably
with that obtained in our event study, which is impressive given that
entirely separate data and methodologies were used to obtain the results.’
In what follows, we take Gagnon et al.’s (2010) time-series estimates as our bench-
mark measure of the impact of the FED’s asset purchase programmes on U.S. long-
term yield spreads–speciﬁcally, for illustrative purposes we will consider the average
between their lower and upper estimates of the impact on the 10-year government
bond yield spread, that is 60 basis points–and we will tackle the following questions:
‘What would have happened if the FED had not engineered such a
yield spread compression via asset purchases? Speciﬁcally, would the U.S.
economy have fallen into deﬂation? Would the output collapse have been
comparable to the one that took place during the Great Depression?’
Figure 6 reports results from the following counterfactual simulation. Starting in
2009Q1, we re-run history
(i) conditional on the time-varying VAR’s estimated coeﬃcients,
(ii) keeping all the structural shocks except the one to the spread unchanged at
their estimated historical values, and
(iii) rescaling the shocks to the spread in such a way that the counterfactual
path for the spread is, for the whole of 2009, 60 basis points higher than the actual
historical path.
An important point to stress about this counterfactual simulation is that, since
we are only manipulating structural shocks, while leaving all other elements of the es-
timated SVAR unchanged–including, ﬁrst and foremost, the monetary policy rule–
such a counterfactual is not vulnerable to Sargent’s (1979) criticism of SVAR-based
policy counterfactuals (for a discussion, see Section 3.2.1).17
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Wkh uvw dqg odvw sdqhov ri wkh jxuh uhsruw dfwxdo lq dwlrq dqg uhdo JGS jurzwk/
wrjhwkhu zlwk wkh phgldqv dqg wkh rqh0vwdqgdug0ghyldwlrq shufhqwlohv ri wkh glvwul0
exwlrqv ri frxqwhuidfwxdo lq dwlrq dqg uhdo JGS jurzwk/ uhvshfwlyho|/ zkhuhdv wkh
plggoh sdqho vkrzv wkh iudfwlrqv ri gudzv iurp wkh srvwhulru glvwulexwlrq iru zklfk
wkh hfrqrp| lv lq gh dwlrq +lw lv zruwk vwuhvvlqj wkdw/ gxulqj 533</ dfwxdo JGS gh0
 dwru lq dwlrq qhyhu zhqw qhjdwlyh,1 Wkh jxuh sruwud|v d vrehulqj slfwxuhr iz k d w
pljkw kdyh ehhq kdg wkh IHG qrw hqjlqhhuhg |lhog vsuhdg frpsuhvvlrqv yld lwv dvvhw
sxufkdvh surjudpphv1 Vshflfdoo|/ edvhg rq phgldq hvwlpdwhv/ pdfurhfrqrplf shu0
irupdqfh zrxog kdyh fohduo| ehhq zruvh/ zlwk lq dwlrq volsslqj voljkwo| ehorz }hur/
dqg rxwsxw jurzwk uhdfklqj d wurxjk ri doprvw plqxv 43 shufhqw lq wkh uvw txduwhu
ri 533<1 Zkdw lv hvshfldoo| qrwhzruwk| ri Iljxuh 9/ krzhyhu/ duh qrw wkh phgldq sur0
mhfwlrqv/ exw udwkhu wkh ulvnv dvvrfldwhg zlwk vxfk surmhfwlrqvwkdw lv/ wkh surohv ri
wkh hqwluh glvwulexwlrqv1 Frqfhuqlqj lq dwlrq/ lq sduwlfxodu/ wkh iudfwlrq ri gudzv iru
zklfk frxqwhuidfwxdo lq dwlrq zrxog kdyh ehhq qhjdwlyh shdnv dw derxw <3 shu fhqw
lq 533<T5/ dqg vwd|v frqvlvwhqwo| eh|rqg 98 shufhqw ryhu wkh qh{w wzr txduwhuv1 Dv
iru rxwsxw jurzwk uhvxowv duh hyhq pruh rplqrxv/ zlwk wkh rqh0vwdqgdug0ghyldwlrq
orzhu shufhqwloh uhdfklqj plqxv 4: shufhqw1 Dowkrxjk wkhvh jxuhv pd| dsshdu/ dw
uvw eoxvk/ dv zlogo| lpsodxvleoh/ lw lv lpsruwdqw wr nhhs lq plqg wkdw lq wkhi r x u w k
txduwhu ri 4<5< X1V1 uhdo JQS frqwudfwhg/ rq d txduwhu0rq0txduwhu dqqxdolvhg edvlv
+wkdw lv/ wkh phdvxuh zh duh xvlqj khuh,/ e| d uhpdundeoh 4:18 shufhqw/z k h u h d vr y h u
wkh wkuhh vxevhtxhqw |hduv +iurp 4<63T4 wr 4<65T7, wkh dyhudjh txduwhu0rq0txduwhu
dqqxdolvhg udwh ri jurzwk zdv htxdo wr plqxv 4317 shufhqw147 Vr/ dowkrxjk wkh uhvxowv
sruwud|hg lq Iljxuh 9 duh rxwvlgh wkh erxqgv ri dgydqfhg frxqwulhv* srvw0ZZLL h{sh0
ulhqfh/ wkh| duh ghqlwho| qrw rxwvlgh wkh erxqgv ri klvwrulfdo h{shulhqfh/ dqg rq wkh
frqwudu|/ wkh| duh h{dfwo| lq olqh zlwk wkh h{shulhqfh ri wkh X1V1 Juhdw Ghsuhvvlrq1
Udwkhu/ lw lv hyhq srvvleoh wr pdnh d vwurqj fdvh wkdw vxfk frxqwhuidfwxdov duh/
dorqj rqh vshflf glphqvlrq/ h{fhvvlyho| rswlplvwlf/ lq wkh iroorzlqj vhqvh1 Zkhq shu0
iruplqj frxqwhuidfwxdovhlwkhu zlwk VYDUv/ ru zlwk GVJH prghovdq lpsruwdqw
lpsolflw dvvxpswlrq ehklqg wkh hqwluh h{huflvh lv wkdw wkh hvwlpdwhg vwuxfwxudo vkrfnv
duh wuxo| vwuxfwxudo/ lq sduwlfxodu lq wkh vhqvh ri ehlqj lqyduldqw wr fkdqjhv lq sro0
lf|1 Dowkrxjk wklv dvvxpswlrq lv d sodxvleoh rqh xqghu qrupdo flufxpvwdqfhv/ zlwklq
wkh suhvhqw frqwh{w lw pljkw ohjlwlpdwho| eh uhjdughg dv txhvwlrqdeoh1 Frqvlghu/ lq
sduwlfxodu/ wkh fdvh ri ghpdqg qrq0srolf| vkrfnv1 Wkh hvwlpdwhg vhtxhqfh ri wkhvh
vkrfnv iru 533< lv frqglwlrqdo rq wkh IHG kdylqj dqqrxqfhg dqg lpsohphqwhg lwv
dvvhw sxufkdvh surjudpphv/ zklfk/ dprqj rwkhu wklqjv/ frqwulexwhg wr cfdop qhuyhv*
dqg wr vwhdg| pdunhwv1 Vxssrvh/ krzhyhu/ wkdw wkh IHG kdg vwrrg lgoh lq wkh idfh
ri wkh fulvlv= lv lw uhdvrqdeoh wr dvvxph wkdw/ xqghu wkhvh flufxpvwdqfhv/ exvlqhvv dqg
frqvxphu frqghqfh zrxog kdyh ehhq wkh vdph dv wkh| kdyh klvwrulfdoo| ehhqB Vxfk
dq dvvxpswlrq lv/ lq rxu ylhz/ d suhww| khurlf rqh/ zklfk dxwrpdwlfdoo| lpsolhv wkdw
wkh uhvxowlqj froodsvh lq frqghqfh zrxog prvw olnho| kdyh ohg wr dq dowhuqdwlyhdqg
47Wkhvh jxuhv duh edvhg rq wkh uhdo JQS gdwd irxqg lq Edonh dqg Jrugrq +4<;9,/ dsshqgl{ E/
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‘worse’–sequence of demand non-policy shocks, and therefore, as a consequence, to
worse macroeconomic performance across the board. We therefore conjecture that,
rather than being unrealistically dire, our counterfactual scenario might in fact be
too rosy, and that things might have turned worse.
3.1.2 The United Kingdom
In a speech delivered in May 2009, the Bank of England’s Deputy Governor, Charlie
Bean, thus spoke of the impact of the Bank’s asset purchase programme on long-term
yield spreads:15
‘There are signs that these measures are having a beneﬁcial impact [...].
Spreads on commercial paper eligible for purchase have fallen by around 1
2
percentage point and the size of the market has increased by around 10%.
Similarly, average spreads on sterling investment grade corporate bonds
for industrial companies have declined by some 60 basis points and gross
issuance of bonds by UK companies has been strong. These developments
may reﬂect a range of inﬂuences, but feedback from market participants
suggests that our purchases have indeed played a helpful role.’
His assessment is supported by empirical evidence presented in Meier (2009) who
purports that the Bank’s purchases of UK government bonds have reduced gilt yields
by a range of at least 35-60 basis points.
Figure 7 reports, for the United Kingdom, results from the same exercise we
discussed in the previous paragraph for the United States, in which we re-run the
U.K. Great Recession based on the estimated SVAR, rescaling the spread shocks for
2009 in such a way that the counterfactual path for the spread is 50 basis points
higher than it has historically been. Unsurprisingly, results are in line with those
for the U.S., and in fact, they are even more ominous, with much stronger deﬂation,
and a signiﬁcantly deeper recession, reaching, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, about
minus 19 percent. Once again, it is possible to make a convincing argument that
these projections are actually optimistic, exactly for the same reason we previously
highlighted for the U.S..
3.2 How powerful is a compression in the yield spread at the
zero lower bound?
3.2.1 Results obtained by ‘zeroing out’ the structural VAR’s monetary
rule
Figures 8, 10, 12, and 14 show, for the U.S., the Euro area, Japan, and the U.K.,
respectively, the median time-varying impulse-response functions (henceforth, IRFs)
15See Bean (2009).19
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ri wkh |lhog vsuhdg/ JGS gh dwru lq dwlrq/ dqg uhdo JGS jurzwk/ wr d rqh0shufhqw
qhjdwlyh vkrfn wr wkh vsuhdg iru doo dydlodeoh txduwhuv1 Iljxuhv </ 44/ 46/ dqg 48/ rq
wkh rwkhu kdqg/ vkrz/ iru wkh vdph frxqwulhv dqg yduldeohv/ dqg iru vhohfwhgt x d u w h u v /
wkh phgldq LUIv wr d rqh0shufhqw qhjdwlyh vkrfn wr wkh vsuhdg/ wrjhwkhu zlwkw k h
49wk dqg ;7wk shufhqwlohv1 Zlwklq wkh suhvhqw h{huflvh wkh vkruw0whup +srolf|, udwh
kdv ehhq nhsw dw }hur erwk rq lpsdfw +e| frqvwuxfwlrq,/ dqg iru wkh vxevhtxhqw hljkw
txduwhuv e| c}hurlqj rxw* wkh vwuxfwxudo YDU*v prqhwdu| uxoh dv iroorzv1
Lq wkh h{huflvh zh duh shuiruplqj/ wkh orqj0whup |lhog vsuhdg lv vxemhfw wr d
rqh0wlph vkrfn htxdo wr plqxv rqh shufhqw/ zkhuhdv wkh vkruw0whup udwh uhpdlqv
x q f k d q j h ge r w kr ql p s d f w  z k l f kz hl p s o h p h q we |f r q v w u x f w l r q /e |w k hy h u |z d|
zh h{wudfw vxfk csxuh* vsuhdg vkrfnvdqg ryhu wkh vxevhtxhqw hljkw txduwhuv1 Zh
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 zlwk wkh h{fhswlrq ri wkh Xqlwhg Vwdwhv/ wkh LUIv ri wkh vsuhdg lwvhoi wr d
qhjdwlyh rqh0shufhqw vkrfn h{klelw olwwoh wlph yduldwlrq1
 Rq wkh frqwudu|/ hylghqfh ri wlph yduldwlrq lv/ lq jhqhudo/ txlwh vxevwdqwldo iru
erwk lq dwlrq dqg uhdo JGS jurzwk/ wkxv surylglqj erwk d vwurqj mxvwlfdwlrq
iru wkh xvh ri wlph0ydu|lqj phwkrgv/ dqg dq lpsruwdqw fdyhdw wr uhvxowv sur0
gxfhg e| {hg0frh!flhqw prghov1 Wklv lv hvshfldoo| dssduhqw iru wkh uhvsrqvhv
ri X1V1 lq dwlrq dqg JGS jurzwk/ zklfk vlqfh wkh hqg ri wkh 4<93v kdyh h{0
klelwhg wkuhh shdnv durxqg wkh wlph ri wkh Juhdw Lq dwlrq ri wkh 4<:3v/ ri wkh
uhfhvvlrq ri wkh hduo| 4<<3v/ dqg ri wkh prvw uhfhqw shulrg1 Wkhvh uhvxowv fohduo|
vxjjhvw wkdw d {hg0frh!flhqw prgho hvwlpdwhg ryhu +vd|, wkh odvw wzr ghfdghv
zloo xqghuvwdwh wkh lpsdfw rq lq dwlrq dqg rxwsxw jurzwk ri d frpsuhvvlrq lq
wkh |lhog vsuhdg gxulqj wkh qdqfldo fulvlv/ dv wklv vdpsoh shulrg pl{hv wzrv x e 0
vdpsohv zklfk/ lq wklv uhvshfw/ duh txlwh glhuhqw1 Hylghqfh ri wlph yduldwlrq
lv hyhq pruh dssduhqw iru wkh Xqlwhg Nlqjgrp/ iru erwk lq dwlrq dqg rxwsxw
jurzwk1 Lq sduwlfxodu/ iru erwk yduldeohv wkh lpsdfw ri d frpsuhvvlrq lq wkh
|lhog vsuhdg dsshduv wr kdyh lqfuhdvhg lq uhfhqw |hduv1
 Ilqdoo|dqg fuxfldoo|/ iru wkh suhvhqw sxusrvhvwkh vwlpxodwlyh srzhu rqe r w k
lq dwlrq dqg rxwsxw jurzwk ri d frpsuhvvlrq lq wkh vsuhdg dsshduv wr eh vxe0
vwdqwldo1 Iru wkh Xqlwhg Vwdwhv lq 533<T7/ iru h{dpsoh/ dqqxdo uhdo JGS jurzwk
lqfuhdvhg +edvhg rq phgldq hvwlpdwhv, e| 416 shufhqw lq wkh txduwhu ri lpsdfw/
lw shdnv dw 41< shufhqw wkuhh txduwhuv diwhu wkh lpsdfw/ dqg lw wkhq udslgo| idghv
dzd| ryhu vxevhtxhqw txduwhuv1 Wkh lpsdfw rq dqqxdo lq dwlrq vwduwv dw 316
shufhqw rq lpsdfw/ lw shdnv dw 414 shufhqw diwhu wkuhh txduwhuv/ dqg lw wkhq
ghfuhdvhv1 Uhvxowv iru wkh rwkhu frxqwulhv duh txdqwlwdwlyho| voljkwo| glhuhqw
exw h{klelw/ ryhudoo/ wkh vdph rughu ri pdjqlwxgh1
D fdyhdw wr wkhvh uhvxowv Dowkrxjk lq sulqflsoh hqwluho| fruuhfw iurp wkh srlqw ri
ylhz ri VYDU phwkrgrorj|/ wklv zd| ri frpsxwlqj wkh LUIv ri lqwhuhvw vxhuv iurp
wkh iroorzlqj vkruwfrplqj1 Vwulfwo| vshdnlqj/ wkh h{huflvh zh kdyh mxvw ghvfulehg lv
dnlq wr d VYDU0edvhg srolf| frxqwhuidfwxdo/ dv lw lv edvhg rq wkh qrwlrq ri wdnlqj dq
hvwlpdwhg VYDU dqg fkdqjlqj +vrph ri, wkh sdudphwhuv lq lwv vwuxfwxudo prqhwdu|
srolf| uxoh +zlwklq wkh suhvhqw frqwh{w/ vhwwlqj wkhp wr }hur,1 Dv vxfk/ dv ruljlqdoo|
srlqwhg rxw e| Vdujhqw +4<:<,/ lw lv yxoqhudeoh wr wkh Oxfdv fulwltxh/ dqg vkrxog eh
uhjdughg/ lq jhqhudo/ dv xquholdeoh1 Lqghhg/ dv vkrzq e| Ehqdwl dqg Vxulfr +533<, e|
phdqv ri d vlqjoh h{dpsoh edvhg rq dq hvwlpdwhg vwdqgdug Qhz Nh|qhvldq prgho/
dqg dv h{whqvlyho| dqdo|vhg e| Ehqdwl +5343d, edvhg rq d edwwhu| ri hvwlpdwhg GVJH
prghov/ wkh uhvxowv surgxfhg e| vxfk frxqwhuidfwxdov pd| wxuq rxw wr eh plvohdglqj1
Lq wkh qh{w sdudjudsk/ zh wkhuhiruh shuirup wkh h{huflvh xqghu frqvlghudwlrq e|
pdqlsxodwlqj prqhwdu| srolf| vkrfnv/ udwkhu wkdq wkh frh!flhqwv ri wkh VYDU*v
prqhwdu| srolf| uxoh121
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3.2.2 Results obtained based on the ‘constant-interest-rate’ projection
methodology
We compute IRFs to a spread shock by choosing, for eight quarters after the impact,
a sequence of monetary policy shocks such as to keep the short-term rate constant,
thus exactly neutralising the impact of the systematic component of monetary policy,
which would call (e.g.) for short-term rate increases in response to increases in inﬂa-
tion and output growth. This method is routinely used within central banks in order
to compute ‘constant interest rate’ (henceforth, CIR) projections. Starting from the
ninth quarter after the impact, on the other hand, we allow the short rate to move
according to what is dictated by the SVAR’s monetary rule. Two things ought to be
stressed here.
First, this way of performing the exercise possesses one important element of
understatement of the macroeconomic impact of a compression in the yield spread:
froma DSGE model’s perspective, since the structural monetary rule which is encoded
in the estimated SVAR predicts that the short-term rate always reacts to the state of
the economy, this exercise ignores, by construction, the impact on agents’ expectations
of the central bank’s announcement that it will keep the interest rate unchanged for
an ‘extended period’.16 Therefore, our results most likely provide a lower bound for
the macroeconomic eﬀect of a compression in the yield spread.
Second, although, from a strictly technical point of view, this exercise is not
vulnerable to the Lucas critique (diﬀerent from the exercise of sub-section 3.2.1,
indeed, we are here uniquely manipulating shocks, rather than the coeﬃcients of the
structural VAR’s monetary rule), from a practical, substantive point of view things
are unfortunately less clear-cut.17 The key point is that the interest rate is here
consistently deviating in one direction–downwards–from the path that would be
implied uniquely by the systematic component of monetary policy, due to a sequence
of interest rate ‘surprises’ (i.e., shocks) all of the same sign. In order to be willing
to assume that, under such circumstances, the public will not revise the model it
uses to forecast the future path of the nominal interest rate, we must be ready to
believe that the it will remain oblivious to such a strong–in fact, perfect–pattern of
autocorrelation of the policy shocks. If, on the other hand, the public were to notice
that policy shocks were no longer drawn from a zero-mean, symmetric distribution,
and they were rather being drawn from a distribution with an upper bound at zero, it
would obviously use this information in order to generate its interest rate forecasts. So
the key question becomes: ‘How reasonable is the assumption that public will behave
in such a myopic way under the present circumstances?’ Answering to this question is
not straightforward: in particular, the fact that the public will or will not detect such
a pattern crucially depends on both how large thye shocks are, and how long they
16We say ‘for an extended period’ since, as we previously pointed out, leaving the interest rate
unchanged forever, and announcing that to the public, leads to global indeterminacy.
17We wish to thank a referee for pointing this out.22
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last. In the limit, the public will obviously detect large and prolonged deviations
from the path which would be uniquely dictated by the systematic component of
monetary policy. In the case of smaller deviations which lasted for a comparatively
short period, on the other hand, the assumption that the public will not detect such
a systematic pattern is less far-fetched.
Compared with the results obtained by ‘zeroing out’ the coeﬃcients of the SVAR’s
monetary rule, the results derived based on the CIR methodology suﬀer from a purely
practical shortcoming: for some countries, and for some quarters, the IRFs we thus
obtain exhibit a signiﬁcant volatility, which, intuitively, is due to the workings of
the following ‘feedback loop’. On impact, a compression of the spread exerts an
expansionary eﬀect, thus raising both output growth and inﬂation. As a consequence,
starting from the ﬁrst quarter after the impact the SVAR’s monetary rule would call
for an increase in the policy rate, in order to counter such expansionary eﬀects. The
negative monetary policy shock we choose in order to neutralise such a reaction of
the short rate, thereby keeping it constant, exerts a further expansionary eﬀect on
inﬂation and output growth, thus compounding the initial impact of the spread shock.
So, depending on (i) how large the impact of a spread shock on inﬂation and output
growth is, and (ii) how strongly monetary policy responds to inﬂation and output
growth, this feedback loop may lead to highly volatile IRFs. On the other hand, in
the limit case in which the short rate did not react to inﬂation and output growth,
the feedback loop would simply not even ‘kick in’, and the problem would not exist.
This implies that this problem is not a general one, but it rather may or may not be
there depending on the speciﬁc structure of the economy at each point in time.
Figures 16-18 illustrates this, by plotting, for the U.S., the Euro area, and the
U.K., the median IRFs computed based on this methodology (these ﬁgures are exactly
comparable to Figures 8, 10, and 14). Results for the U.K. are quite remarkably
similar to those produced based on the alternative methodology. Those for the Euro
area exhibit a greater volatility for a few quarters, but other than that are, once
again, in the same ‘ballpark’ as those reported in Figure 10. Results for the U.S.,
however, are, for several quarters, implausibly volatile, thus reﬂecing the workings of
the previously discussed feedback loop.
3.2.3 On the sources of time-variation
As we previosuly discussed, based on either of the two methodologies we detect signif-
icant time-variation in the economy’s response to a compression in the yield spread.
Although identifying the sources of such time-variation is clearly beyond the scope
of this paper, one possible cause deserves to be at least brieﬂy mentioned.18 Histor-
ically, changes in the yield spread for a given short rate have had a multiplicity of
causes: shifts in long-term inﬂation expectations, changes in the liquidity premium,
etc. etc.. Since it is at least possible to entertain the hypothesis that diﬀerent under-
18We wish to thank a referee for pointing this out.23
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lying causes of changes in the yield spread may lead to a diﬀerent pattern of response
of the economy–that is, to diﬀerent impulse-response functions to a compression
of the yield spread of a given magnitude–one obvious possibility for the identiﬁed
changes over time in the pattern of the IRFs is that such changes may simply result
from a change in the ‘mixture’ of the underlying shocks leading to changes in the
yield spread.
4 Conclusions
We have explored the macroeconomic impact of a compression in the long-term bond
yield spread within the context of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 via a Bayesian
time-varying parameter structural VAR. We have identiﬁed a ‘pure’ spread shock
which, leaving the short-term rate unchanged by construction, has allowed us to
characterise the macroeconomic consequences of a compression in the yield spread
induced by central banks’ asset purchases within an environment in which the short
rate cannot move because it is constrained by the zero lower bound. Two main
ﬁndings have stood out. First, in all the countries we have analysed (U.S., Euro area,
Japan, and U.K.) a compression in the long-term yield spread exerts a powerful eﬀect
on both output growth and inﬂation. Second, conditional on available estimates of the
impact of the FED’s and the Bank of England’s asset purchase programmes on long-
term government bond yield spreads, our counterfactual simulations have indicated
that both in the U.S. and in the U.K. unconventional monetary policy actions have
been successful at averting signiﬁcant risks both of deﬂation and of output collapses
comparable to those that took place during the Great Depression.24
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Fdqryd/ I1/ dqg M1 Slqd +5338,= Zkdw YDU Whoo Xv Derxw GVJH Prghov/ lq
Glherow/ F1 dqg N|uwvrx/ F1 Qhz Wuhqgv Lq Pdfurhfrqrplf/ Vsulqjhu Yhuodj1
Fduwhu/ F1 N1/ dqg U1 S1 Nrkq +5337,= Rq Jleev Vdpsolqj iru Vwdwh Vsdfh
Prghov Elrphwulnd/ ;4/ 8748861
Frjoh|/ W1/ dqg W1 M1 Vdujhqw +5335,= Hyroylqj Srvw0ZZLL X1V1 Lq dwlrq
G|qdplfv/ lq E1 Ehuqdqnh dqg N1 Urjr/ hgv1 +5335,/ QEHU Pdfurhfrqrplfv
Dqqxdov 53341
+5338,= Guliwv dqg Yrodwlolwlhv= Prqhwdu| Srolflhv dqg Rxwfrphv lq wkh
Srvw ZZLL X1V1/ Uhylhz ri Hfrqrplf G|qdplfv/ ;+Dsulo,/ 5956351
Frjoh|/ W1 Z1/ J1 H1 Sulplfhul/ dqg W1 M1 Vdujhqw +5343,= Lq dwlrq0Jds
Shuvlvwhqfh lq wkh X1V1/ Dphulfdq Hfrqrplf Mrxuqdo= Pdfurhfrqrplfv/i r u w k f r p 0
lqj1
GhoQhjur/ P1/ J1 Hjjhuwvrq/ D1 Ihuuhur/ dqg Q1 Nl|rwdnl +5343,= Wkh
Juhdw HvfdshB D Txdqwlwdwlyh Hydoxdwlrq ri wkh Ihg*v Qrq0Vwdqgdug Srolflhv/
Ihghudo Uhvhuyh Edqn ri Qhz \run dqg Sulqfhwrq Xqlyhuvlw|/ plphr1
Idxvw/ M1 +4<<;,= Wkh Urexvwqhvv ri Lghqwlhg YDU Frqfoxvlrqv Derxw Prqh|/
Fduqhjlh0Urfkhvwhu Frqihuhqfh Vhulhv rq Sxeolf Srolf|/ 7</ 53:5771
J d j q r q /M 1 /P 1U d v n l q /M 1U h p d f k h /dqg E1 Vdfn +5343,= Odujh0Vfdoh Dv0
vhw Sxufkdvhv e| wkh Ihghudo Uhvhuyh= Glg Wkh| ZrunB/ Shwhuvrq Lqvwlwxwh iru
Lqwhuqdwlrqdo Hfrqrplfv dqg Ihghudo Uhvhuyh Edqn ri Qhz \run/ plphr1
Jhzhnh/ M1 +4<<5,= Hydoxdwlqj wkh Dffxudf| ri Vdpsolqj0Edvhg Dssurdfkhv wr wkh
Fdofxodwlrq ri Srvwhulru Prphqwv/ lq M1 P1 Ehuqdugr/ M1 Ehujhu/ D1 S1 Gdzlg dqg
D1 I1 P1 Vplwk +hgv1,/ Ed|hvldq Vwdwlvwlfv/ R{irug Xqlyhuvlw| Suhvv/ R{irug/ ss1
49<4<61
Mdftxlhu/ H1/ Q1 J1 Srovrq/ dqg S1 Urvvl +4<<7,= Ed|hvldq Dqdo|vlv ri Vwrfkdv0
wlf Yrodwlolw| Prghov Mrxuqdo ri Exvlqhvv dqg Hfrqrplf Vwdwlvwlf/ 45/ 6:474;1
Nlp/ F1 M1/ dqg F1 Qhovrq +5333,= Vwdwh0Vsdfh Prghov zlwk Uhjlph Vzlwfklqj1
Fdpeulgjh/ Pdvv1/ Wkh PLW Suhvv1
Ohq}d/ P1/ K1 Sloo/ dqg O1 Uhlfkolq +5343,= Prqhwdu| Srolf| lq H{fhswlrqdo
Wlphv/ FHSU Zrunlqj Sdshu Q1 :99</ Mdqxdu| 53431
Phlhu/ D1 +533<,= Sdqdfhd/ Fxuvh/ ru QrqhyhqwB Xqfrqyhqwlrqdo Prqhwdu| Srolf|
lq wkh Xqlwhg Nlqjgrp/ FHSU Zrunlqj Sdshu Q1 :99</ Mdqxdu| 5343/L q w h u q d 0
wlrqdo Prqhwdu| Ixqg/ Zrunlqj Sdshu 3<2496126
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Shhuvpdq/ J1 +5338,= Zkdw Fdxvhg wkh Hduo| Ploohqqlxp VorzgrzqB Hylghqfh
E d v h gr qY h f w r uD x w r u h j u h v v l r q v / Mrxuqdo ri Dssolhg Hfrqrphwulfv/ 53/ 4;853:1
Sulplfhul/ J1 H1 +5338,= Wlph Ydu|lqj Vwuxfwxudo Yhfwru Dxwruhjuhvvlrqv dqg
Prqhwdu| Srolf|/ Wkh Uhylhz ri Hfrqrplf Vwxglhv/ :5/ ;54;851
Uxelr0Udpluh}/ M1/ G1 Zdjjrqhu/ dqg W1 ]kd +5338,= Uhjlph Fkdqjhv lq wkh
Hxur Duhd/ Ihghudo Uhvhuyh Edqn ri Dwodqwd/ plphr1
U x g h e x v f k /J 1G 1 /E 1S 1V d f n /dqg H1 W1 Vzdqvrq +533:,= Pdfurhfrqrplf
Lpsolfdwlrqv ri Fkdqjhv lq wkh Whup Suhplxp/ Ihghudo Uhvhuyh Edqn ri Vw1 Orxlv
Uhylhz/ Mxo|2Dxjxvw/ ;<+7,/ 5749<1
Vdujhqw/ W1 M1 +4<:<,= Hvwlpdwlqj Yhfwru Dxwruhjuhvvlrqv Xvlqj Phwkrgv Qrw
Edvhg rq H{solflw Hfrqrplf Wkhrulhv/ Ihghudo Uhvhuyh Edqn ri Plqqhdsrolv Txdu0
whuo| Uhylhz/6 + V x p p h u , /;  4 8 1
Vwrfn/ M1/ dqg P1 Zdwvrq +4<<9,= Hylghqfh ri Vwuxfwxudo Lqvwdelolw| lq Pdfur0
hfrqrplf Wlph Vhulhv Uhodwlrqv/ Mrxuqdo ri Exvlqhvv dqg Hfrqrplf Vwdwlvwlfv/
47+4,/ 44631
Xkolj/ K1 +5338,= Zkdw duh wkh Hhfwv ri Prqhwdu| Srolf| rq RxwsxwB Uh0
vxowv iurp dq Djqrvwlf Lghqwlfdwlrq Surfhgxuh/ Mrxuqdo ri Prqhwdu| Hfrqrplfv/
85+5,/ 6;474<127
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Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, and a short-
term rate are from the European Central Bank’s database. The sample period is
1970:1-2008:4. The 5- and 10-year Euro area composite corporate yields for AAA-
rated bonds are from Reuters (acronyms are C6645Y and C66410Y), and are both
available for the period April 2002-March 2009. For the period before April 2002 we
linked the two series to the monthly series for the 5- and 10-year government bond
yields from Reuters. Over the period of overlapping (that is, after April 2002) the
corporate and government bond yield series exhibit a remarkably close co-movement,
with only a systematic diﬀerence of several basis points between the corporate yield
series and the corresponding government yield one. So we rescaled the government
bond series in such a way that its value in April 2002 be the same as the value taken
by the corporate bond series, and we linked the two series. Given (i) our focus on
the most recent quarters, and (ii) our use of a time-varying parameters VAR, the
fact that before April 2002 we only have a reasonable proxy for the corporate yields,
rather than the actual series of interest should not be regarded as problematic. We
converted the monthly linked series to the quarterly frequency by taking averages
within the quarter.
A.2 Japan
A monthly seasonally unadjusted series for the 12-year corporate bond yield (‘Japan
- yield, secondary market, corporate bonds, 12 years, o.t.c., month-end’) is from the
Bank for International Settlements database. The acronym is BISM.M.HHHA.JP.01,
and the sample period is August 1965-March 2009. We converted the monthly series
to the quarterly frequency by taking averages within the quarter. Quarterly sea-
sonally adjusted series for real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, and the discount rate are
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.
The acronyms are 15899BVRZF..., 15899BIRZF..., and 15860...ZF..., and the sample
period is 1957Q1-2008Q4.
A.3 United States
A monthly seasonally unadjusted series for the Federal Funds rate (acronym is FED-
FUNDS) available for the period July 1954-March 2009, is from the St. Louis FED’s
database on the web. We converted it to the quarterly frequency by taking averages
within the quarter. Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for real GDP the GDP deﬂa-
tor (acronyms are GDPC96 and GDPDEF), available for the period 1947Q1-2008Q4,
are from the same database. A monthly seasonally unadjusted series for Fannie
Mae’s 30-year corporate bond yield, available from November 2000 to March 2009,28
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was linked to the 30-year Treasury constant maturity rate from the Federal Reserve
Board in the same way as we did for the Euro area, by rescaling the government bond
series in such a way that the value it takes in November 2000 is the same as that
taken by the Fannie Mae’s 30-year corporate bond yield. Again, our focus on the
most recent quarters and our use of time-varying techniques justiﬁes such a linking,
as the government bond yield we use before November 2000 represents a noisy proxy
for Fannie Mae’s 30-year corporate bond yield, and once the time-varying parameters
VAR has reached the end of the sample, the inﬂuence of any diﬀerence between the
rescaled government bond yield and Fannie Mae’s corporate yield has can safely be
assumed to have all but disappeared.
A.4 United Kingdom
Quarterly seasonally adjusted series for real GDP and the GDP deﬂator are from the
Oﬃce for National Statistics, adn are available since the ﬁrst quarter of 1955. The
Treasury bill rate and the long-term government bond yield are from the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.
B Details of the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo Pro-
cedure
We estimate (1)-(10) via Bayesian methods. The next two subsections describe our
choices for the priors, and the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm we use to simu-
late the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states conditional on
the data, while the third section lays out how we compute the generalised impulse-
response functions.
B.1 Priors
For the sake of simplicity, the prior distributions for the initial values of the states–θ0,
α0, h0, and q0–which we postulate all to be normal, are assumed to be independent
both from one another, and from the distribution of the hyperparameters. In order
to calibrate the prior distributions for θ0, α0, h0, and q0 we estimate a time-invariant
version of (1) based on the ﬁrst 10 years of data, and we set
θ0 ∼ N
 
ˆ θOLS,4   ˆ V (ˆ θOLS)
 
(B1)
As for α0 and h0 we proceed as follows. Let ˆ ΣOLS be the estimated covariance matrix
of ǫt from the time-invariant VAR, and let C be the lower-triangular Choleski factor
of ˆ ΣOLS–i.e., CC′ = ˆ ΣOLS. We set
lnh0 ∼ N(ln 0,10 × I4) (B2)29
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zkhuh f lv d yhfwru froohfwlqj wkh vtxduhg hohphqwv rq wkh gldjrqdo ri F1Z hw k h q
glylgh hdfk froxpq ri F e| wkh fruuhvsrqglqj hohphqw rq wkh gldjrqdoohw*v fdoo wkh
pdwul{ zh wkxv rewdlq  Fdqg zh vhw
f  Qd f>  Y E fo +E6,
zkhuh  fzklfk/ iru ixwxuh uhihuhqfh/ zh ghqh dv  f  d f>>  f>2>===>  f>Solv d
yhfwru froohfwlqj doo wkh qrq0}hur dqg qrq0rqh hohphqwv ri  F3 +l1h/ wkh hohphqwv ehorz
wkh gldjrqdo,/ dqg lwv fryduldqfh pdwul{/  Y E f/ lv srvwxodwhg wr eh gldjrqdo/ zlwk
hdfk lqglylgxdo +m/m, hohphqw htxdo wr 43 wlphv wkh devroxwh ydoxh ri wkh fruuhvsrqglqj
m0wk hohphqw ri  f1 Vxfk d fkrlfh iru wkh fryduldqfh pdwul{ ri f lv fohduo| duelwudu|/
exw lv prwlydwhg e| rxu jrdo wr vfdoh wkh yduldqfh ri hdfk lqglylgxdo hohphqwr if lq
vxfk d zd| dv wr wdnh lqwr dffrxqw ri wkh hohphqw*v pdjqlwxgh1
Dv iru tf zh surfhhg dv iroorzv1 Ohw Tf eh wkh sulru pdwul{ iru wkh h{whqw ri
udqgrp0zdon guliw ri wkh YDU*v sdudphwhuv +wkdw lv/ wkh udqgrp zdonv froohfwhg lq
wkh yhfwru w,w k d wz hz r x o gx v hl iz hz h u hz r u n l q jz l w kdw u d g l w l r q d oE d | h v l d q
wlph0ydu|lqj sdudphwhuv YDU zlwk d frqvwdqw h{whqw ri udqgrp0zdon guliw ryhu wkh
vdpsoh1 Zh vhw Tf @   	 PROV/z l w k@413433e/ wkh vdph ydoxh xvhg lq Sulplfhul
+5338,/ dqg d uhodwlyho| cfrqvhuydwlyh* sulru iru wkh h{whqw ri guliw frpsduhg +h1j1, wr
wkh 618433e xvhg e| Frjoh| dqg Vdujhqw +5338,1 Zh vhw
*?tf  QEf
32  *? 7 tf>f  LQuEnQs +E7,
zkhuh 7 tf lv d yhfwru froohfwlqj wkh hohphqwv rq wkh gldjrqdo ri Tf1
Wxuqlqj wr wkh k|shusdudphwhuv/ zh srvwxodwh lqghshqghqfh ehwzhhq wkh sdud0
phwhuv fruuhvsrqglqj wr wkh pdwulfhv V dqg ]dq dvvxpswlrq zh dgrsw xqltxho|
iru uhdvrqv ri frqyhqlhqfhdqg zh pdnh wkh iroorzlqj/ vwdqgdug dvvxpswlrqv1 Wkh
wkuhh eorfnv ri V duh dvvxphg wr iroorz lqyhuwhg Zlvkduw glvwulexwlrqv/ zlwk sulru




















Dv iru 7 V/ 7 V2 dqg 7 V/ zh fdoleudwh wkhp edvhg rq  f lq +E6, dv 7 V@433 m  f>m/
7 V2@433gldjEdm f>2m>m f>mo dqg 7 V@433gldjEdm f>em>m f>Dm>m f>Smo1V x f k d
fdoleudwlrq lv frqvlvwhqw zlwk wkh rqh zh dgrswhg iru T/ dv lw lv htxlydohqw wr vhwwlqj
7 V/ 7 V2 dqg 7 V htxdo wr 433e wlphv wkh uhohydqw gldjrqdo eorfn ri  Y E f lq +E6,1
Dv iru wkh yduldqfhv ri wkh lqqrydwlrqv wr wkh vwrfkdvwlf yrodwlolwlhv iru wkh YDU*v
uhgxfhg0irup vkrfnv/ zh iroorz Frjoh| dqg Vdujhqw +5335/ 5338, dqg zh srvwxodwh dq
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Finally, as for the variances of the innovations to the stochastic volatilities for the
VAR’s random-walk parameters’ innovations, we postulate an inverse-Gamma distri-












(B9) implies that the prior for σ2
ω,i has the same mean as in Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2010), but it has a smaller variance.
B.2 Simulating the posterior distribution
We simulate the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters and the states condi-
tional on the data via the following MCMC algorithm, combining elements of Prim-
iceri (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005). In what follows, xt denotes the
entire history of the vector x up to time t–i.e. xt ≡ [x′
1, x′
2,..., x′
t]′–while T is the
sample length.
(a) Drawing the elements of θt Conditional on Y T, αT, and HT, the observation
equation (1) is linear, with Gaussian innovations and a known covariance matrix.
Following Carter and Kohn (2004), the density p(θ
















Conditional on αT, HT, and V , the standard Kalman ﬁlter recursions nail down the
ﬁrst element on the right hand side of (B10), p(θT|Y T,αT,HT,V ) = N(θT,PT), with
PT being the precision matrix of θT produced by the Kalman ﬁlter. The remaining
elements in the factorization can then be computed via the backward recursion algo-
rithm found, e.g., in Kim and Nelson (2000), or Cogley and Sargent (2005, appendix
B.2.1). Given the conditional normality of θt, we have
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t (θt+1 − θt) (B11)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP
−1
t+1|tPt|t (B12)
which provides, for each t from T-1 to 1, the remaining elements in (1), p(θt|θt+1,
Y T, αT, HT, V ) = N(θt|t+1, Pt|t+1). Speciﬁcally, the backward recursion starts with
a draw from N(θT,PT), call it ˜ θT Conditional on ˜ θT, (B11)-(B12) give us θT−1|T and
PT−1|T, thus allowing us to draw ˜ θT−1 from N(θT−1|T,PT−1|T), and so on until t=1.
(b) Drawing the elements of αt Conditional on Y T, θ
T, and HT, following Prim-
iceri (2005), we draw the elements of αt as follows. Equation (1) can be rewritten as
At˜ Yt ≡ At(Yt-X
′
tθt)=Atǫt ≡ ut, with Var(ut)=Ht, namely
˜ Y2,t = −α21,t˜ Y1,t + u2,t (B13)31
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˜ Y3,t = −α31,t˜ Y1,t − α32,t˜ Y2,t + u3,t (B14)
˜ Y4,t = −α41,t˜ Y1,t − α42,t˜ Y2,t − α43,t˜ Y3,t + u4,t (B15)
–plus the identity ˜ Y1,t = u1,t–where [˜ Y1,t, ˜ Y2,t, ˜ Y3,t, ˜ Y4,t]′ ≡ ˜ Yt. Based on the ob-
servation equations (B13)-(B15), and the transition equation (8), the elements of αt
can then be drawn by applying the same algorithm we described in the previous
paragraph separately to (B13)-(B15). The assumption that S has the block-diagonal
structure (10) is in this respect crucial, although, as stressed by Primiceri (2005,
Appendix D), it could in principle be relaxed.
(c) Drawing the elements of Ht Conditional on Y T, θ
T, and αT, the orthogo-
nalised innovations ut ≡ At(Yt-X
′
tθt), with Var(ut)=Ht, are observable. Following
Cogley and Sargent (2002), we then sample the hi,t’s by applying the univariate al-
gorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) element by element.19
(d) Drawing the elements of Qt Conditional on θ
T, the innovations ηt=θt-θt−1,
with Var(ηt)=Qt, are observable, and, along the lines of point (c), we therefore sample
the qj,t’s by applying the univariate algorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994)
element by element.
(e) Drawing the hyperparameters Finally, conditional on Y T, θ
T, HT, and αT, the
innovations to θt, αt, the hi,t’s and the qi,t’s are observable, which allows us to draw
the hyperparameters–the elements of S1, S2, S3 and the σ2
ν,i and the σ2
ω,i–from their
respective distributions.
Summing up, the MCMC algorithm simulates the posterior distribution of the
states and the hyperparameters, conditional on the data, by iterating on (a)-(e). In
what follows, we use a burn-in period of 50,000 iterations to converge to the ergodic
distribution, and after that we run 10,000 more iterations sampling every 10th draw
in order to reduce the autocorrelation across draws.20
B.3 Computing Generalised Impulse-Response Functions
Here we describe the Monte Carlo integration procedure we use in Section 3.2 to
compute generalised IRFs to a spread shock.
Randomly draw the current state of the economy at time t from the Gibbs sam-
pler’s output. Given the current state of the economy, repeat the following procedure
100 times. Draw four independent N(0, 1) variates–the four structural shocks–and









t are the monetary policy, spread, demand non-policy, and supply structural
shocks, respectively, compute the reduced-form shocks ǫt at time t. Simulate both
the VAR’s time-varying parameters and the covariance matrix of its reduced-form
innovations,  t, 20 quarters into the future. Based on the simulated  t, randomly
19For details, see Cogley and Sargent (2005, Appendix B.2.5).
20In this we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005). As stressed by Cogley and Sargent (2005), however,
this has the drawback of ‘increasing the variance of ensemble averages from the simulation’.32
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gudz uhgxfhg0irup vkrfnv iurp w.4 wr w. 5 3 1 E d v h gr qw k hv l p x o d w h gw/d q gr q
wkh vhtxhqfh ri uhgxfhg0irup vkrfnv iurp w wr w.53/ frpsxwh vlpxodwhg sdwkv iru
wkh irxu hqgrjhqrxv yduldeohv1 Fdoo wkhvh vlpxodwhg sdwkv dv 	 [
m
w>wn2f/ m @ 4/ 11/ 4331
Uhshdw wkh vdph surfhgxuh 433 wlphv edvhg rq h{dfwo| wkh vdph vlpxodwhg sdwkv iru
wkh YDU*v wlph0ydu|lqj sdudphwhuv/ wkh w> wkh vdph uhgxfhg0irup vkrfnv dw wlphv
w.4 wr w.53> dqg wkh vdph vwuxfwxudo vkrfnv hP
w / hG
w /d q ghV
w dw wlph w/ exw vhwwlqj
hVS
w wr rqh1 Fdoo wkhvh vlpxodwhg sdwkv dv  [
m
w>wn2f1 Iru hdfk ri wkh 433 lwhudwlrqv ghqh
lui
m
w>wn2f  	 [
m
w>wn2f   [
m
w>wn2f1 Ilqdoo|/ frpsxwh hdfk ri wkh 4/333 jhqhudolvhg LUIv dv
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